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Financial Stability of the Banking 
Sector in European Countries:  
A Comparative Analysis 
 
Summary: The outburst of the financial crisis in 2008 raised a number of ques-
tions about financial stability and banking development, given that the crisis orig-
inated in advanced economies, where the financial sector had grown both very
large and very complex. This study presents the results of research into ways of 
ensuring financial stability in the banking sectors in European and EU associated
countries. The empirical analysis for EU member and associate countries is car-
ried out for the period 2004-2014 and shows that significant heterogeneity in the
member states’ descriptions of their banking sectors not only led to different lev-
els of Z-score, but also to principally different factors influencing the stability of
banking activities in EU countries and countries associated with the EU. 
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In EU countries the study of the mechanisms governing the functioning and effective-
ness of the banking sector has been established as one of the priorities for assuring the 
development, the stability and the sustainability of economic systems. Consistently, 
the necessity of fundamental banking sector reforms has been brought on the agenda 
for the countries being associated with the EU, facing the challenge of the fast imple-
mentation of new operation principles, the establishment of banking regulation bodies, 
and the build-up of financial capabilities.  
Due to the dynamic development of the financial system, the presence of the 
integration process and the development of financial instruments, it is necessary to 
identify scientific and methodological approaches to the understanding of the mecha-
nism for ensuring financial stability. Taking into consideration the importance of early 
detection of the most destructive signals that affect the banking sector, the objective of 
this paper is detect factors that show the increase of the likelihood of the violation of 
financial stability in the country to show the need for increased financial regulation. 
To this aim, in the empirical analysis we show that these factors can have a different 
strength depending on the group of countries considered (the “old” EU members, the 
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1. Literature Review 
 
In the theoretical discussion on determining the economic category of “financial sta-
bility”, two basic approaches can be identified. The first approach is systemic and, 
according to scholars (Roger W. Ferguson 2002; Garry Schinasi 2004) argue that fi-
nancial stability is related to the ability of the financial system to meet endogenous and 
exogenous shocks. The second approach is functional and based on the premise that 
the financial instability in a country makes it impossible for the financial (banking) 
sector to perform the main functions in the economy. As is the case in most European 
countries, the banking sector is a critical component of the financial sector and serves 
as an important element in the sustainable development of the economy. Frederic S. 
Mishkin (1999) emphasizes that the asymmetric information is a feature innate in the 
banking sector and further reduces its transformational function. E. Philip Davis (2001) 
defines financial instability as the precursor of a financial crisis that leads to the col-
lapse of the financial system and its inability to redistribute financial resources in the 
state. John Chant (2010) proves that financial stability should be considered through 
its absence, namely through the polar economic category of “financial instability”. The 
European Central Bank (2017) defines financial stability as the state in which the bank-
ing sector can prevent the build-up of systemic risk, but key risks “continue to stem 
from imbalances and vulnerabilities in the fiscal, macroeconomic and financial sector 
domains”. Heiko Hesse and Martin Čihák (2007) has proposed that financial stability 
at the systemic level relates to the absence of system-wide episodes in which the fi-
nancial system fails to function and about resilience of financial systems to stress. 
Mario Strassberger and Larysa Sysoyeva (2016), argue that financial stability should 
be understood as a permanent capacity of the banking sector to the continuous perfor-
mance of its functions without adverse negative effects on the real sector. Maria-Eleni 
K. Agoraki, Manthos D. Delis, and Fotios Pasiouras (2011) show that financial stabil-
ity of banks depends on the different country-specific institutional characteristics. In 
addition, some authors think, that the role of capital regulation on banking sector sta-
bility are necessary. Patrick Van Roy (2004) determined that rigorous capital require-
ments in the early 1990’s resulted in financial stability and reduced credit risk in the 
G10 countries. Jahn Nadya and Thomas Kick (2014), using the panel regression model, 
try to identify determinants of banking sector stability in Germany. The indicator con-
sists of three parameters: probability of default of certain bank, credit spread and stock 
market index for the banking sector.  Charles Goodhart and Miguel Segoviano (2015) 
also presented some empirical results that are based on the Banking Stability Index 
(BSI) as an indicator, which try to predict the amount of banks that become bankrupt 
as a result of bankruptcy of certain banks. 
The stable operation of the banking sector is an important factor in ensuring 
financial development in EU countries and associated countries. Bearing this is mind, 
this paper aims at studying the factors able to assure the stability of banks and the 
banking sector and to identify the factors that render it vulnerable, hence increasing 
the probability of a financial crisis. 
The indicator of financial stability we use as our dependent variable is the so-
called Z-score. The choice is based on the following reasons: first of all this indicator 
is recognized by the World Bank as a measure of the stability of the banking system.  
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Secondly, we follow Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic (2002), Hesse and 
Čihák (2007), Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (2011) and Deniz Anginer, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Min Zhu (2012), and use the Z-score as a rough measure of sys-
temic soundness. Third, the individual bank’s Z-score is widely used as a measure of 
bank distance to default (John H. Boyd and David E. Runkle 1993; Thorsten Beck and 
Luc Laeven 2006; Laeven and Ross Levine 2009).  
We compute the Z-score by weighted aggregation of all individual banks’ Z-
score in the country j at time t. The higher the probability of failure, the lower the Z-
score will be. It is calculated using the formula:  
 
Z-score=  ( ) , (1)
 
where ROA is the profitability of bank assets, %; Equity  is the value of a bank’s equity;  
Assets is the value of bank’s assets; sd(ROA) is standard deviation in terms of return 
on assets of the bank. 
Z-score methods are used for the bank stability analysis through the prism of 
different financial risks and economic factors under which the financial institutions 
work. A high value of Z-score means long distance to the capital consumption and low 
probability of the bank insolvency. 
 
2. Data, Empirical Model and Methods 
 
The time horizon of the study covers the period from 2007 to 2014. The object of the 
study are parameters characterizing the state of the banking sector in EU countries 
(EU-28 countries, with the exclusion of UK, due to missing information on the explan-
atory variables) and countries associated with the EU (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia). 
All the statistical information was formed on the basis of data provided by the Federal 
Bank of St. Louis Economic Research (2016)1 and the World Bank (2016a)2 because 
the usage of this information allows comparing the development level of the banking 
sector in different countries by the indexes developed and calculated using the same 
method that significantly improves the accuracy of the results. These features of further 
analysis will promote synchronization of received payment according to the require-
ments and standards adopted at the supranational level. 
The set of factors identified as the drivers of financial staibilty include: bank 
branches per 100,000 adults (branch); bank concentration, in % (conc); bank cost to 
income ratio, in % (cost); % of bank credit on bank deposits (cred); bank deposits to 
GDP, in % (deposit); bank net interest margin, in % (int_marg); bank noninterest in-
come to total income (nonint_inc); % of bank nonperforming loans on gross loans 
(np_loans); % bank overhead costs on total assets (overhead); % of bank regulatory 
capital on risk-weighted assets (reg_cap); bank return on assets, in %, before tax 
(ROA) and bank return on equity, in %, before tax (ROE). 
 
1 Federal Bank of St. Louis Economic Research. 2016. Bank Credit to Bank Deposits for United States. 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDSI04USA156NWDB (accessed November 30, 2016). 
2 World Bank. 2016. World Development Indicators.  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed November 15, 2016).  
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The relevance of mentioned statistics, firstly, consists in the fact that the study 
of the highlighted significant indicators provides a comprehensive assessment of the 
steady state of the banking sector taking into consideration the impact nature of these 
criteria on general indicators, Z-score. Secondly, the choice of these parameters is due 
to their relevance regarding the effectiveness of independent variables; the empirical 
model obviously included a more limited set of variables, in order to avoid factors 
collinearity. 
The features and the expected impact of the factors listed above need to be dis-
cussed. The indicator “bank credit to bank deposit ratio” determines the financial re-
sources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of total 
deposits. A ratio above one demonstrates that private sector lending is also funded with 
non-deposit sources that could lead to financial instability. We can observe such situ-
ations in banks of many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Studies by Robert G. 
King and Levine (1993) have shown that countries with higher levels of private credit 
to GDP grow faster and experience faster rates of poverty reduction. Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1997) indicate that credit growth is a positive crisis predictor. Nor-
man Loayza and Romain Ranciere (2006) point out that there is a short-term negative 
relationship between credit levels and growth in GDP per capita. 
According to Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2019) net interest margins 
have decreased. The higher level of net interest margin and overhead cost, the lower 
level of banking efficiency. Banks in rich countries, as a rule, have lower cost-income 
coefficients. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2019) examined the NPL impact on 
the probability of a systemic crisis in the banking sector using data on 69 countries 
over the period of 1980-1997 years. In particular, these authors define a systemic bank-
ing crisis as a situation when distressed assets exceed 10% of total bank assets or when 
the government takes extraordinary steps such as a moratorium or the nationalization 
of the big part of the banking sector.  
At the present stage of the economic development, among the issues that arise 
during the process of restoring the financial stability in the country with the financial 
crisis, the creation of an effective structure of the banking system takes an important 
place. While examining the literature in the context of analyzing the concentration ra-
tios of the banking sector and the financial stability we can determine the existence of 
two opposite approaches. Concentration might have a positive impact on the financial 
stability of the banking system. According to several studies (Santiago Carbó-
Valverde, Luis Enrique Pedauga, and Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández 2013) with the 
methodology on a panel of banks belonging to twenty-three in the period 1996-2010 
that rely on Z-score as a measure of bank stability and concentration or Lerner 
measures for competition, banking concentration promotes financial stability while a 
decrease of competition produces financial instability. J. Juan Fernández de Guevara 
and Joaquin Maudos (2011) find that financial development promotes economic 
growth as well as more competition and financial instability, suggesting that banking 
competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for more opaque 
companies.  
However, other authors contend that concentration migh have a negative impact 
on the stability of the banking system. They argue that monopolistic or oligopolistic 
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situations in the banking system lead banks raise interest rates on loans, which in turn 
increases the risk of portfolio loans through adverse selection (worse projects are 
funded) and moral hazard. They believe that the large number of banks in the banking 
sector that leads to the capital fragmentation increases overall operating costs in the 
banking system and reduces the bank profitability. The solution to this problem lies in 
stimulating assets concentration in the banking sector. In general, the large size of the 
banking sector, high density, and interdependence of banks in the EU countries creates 
significant systemic risks to the mitigation efforts of EU member states. Sandrine 
Corvoisier and Reint Gropp (2002) concluded that increased concentration in the bank-
ing market has led to the reduction in competition and reducing rates on the deposit 
market. On the other hand, in pricing investigations in banks after mergers in Italy, it 
was concluded that during long-term period the deposit price increases, especially, in 
the most efficient banks that confirm the lack of management motives in absorption 
(Dario Focarelli, Fabio Panetta, and Carmelo Salleo 2002; Sijn Claessens and Laeven 
2003) find a very low correlation between concentration and banking competitiveness. 
Empirical studies of the Spanish banking sector conducted by Gabriel Jiménez, Jose 
A. Lopez, and Jesus Saurina Salas (2010) found no evidence of a direct relationship 
between bank competition and system stability. Nevertheless, this indicator is still the 
most readily available market structure indicator across countries. King and Levine 
(1993) believe that countries with deposit money banks have high levels of financial 
development. 
The indicators return on equity and return on assets are quite different in high-
income countries and low-income countries.  




where subscripts i and t refer to countries and years, respectively (i = 1, …, 30; t = 
2007, ..., 2014); αi and τt are country and time specific effects, respectively, and εit is the idiosyncratic error term. The acronyms indicate the variables as described above. 
Our interest lies in the identification of possible differences in the drivers of 
financial stability for different sets of countries. Due to non-uniform level of the de-
velopment and infrastructure of their markets, the 28 EU members are grouped based 
on the EU accession principle – the old European states (EU-15 minus UK), new mem-
ber states (EU-13) and associated states (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia). 
To estimate the heterogeneity in the impact of the explanatory variables for dif-
ferent groups of countries, we interact each right hand variable with the following 
dummy variables: EU_13, which is one for new EU member states and zero otherwise; 
and EU_ASS, which is one for the associated countries (Ukraine, Moldova and Geor-
gia) and zero otherwise. In this augmented model, the coefficients of the interaction 
variables describe, if significantly different from zero, the difference in the impact of 
the explanatory variables compared to the reference group (EU-15 member countries). 
Z  scorei ,t i  t Z  scorei ,t1 1branchi ,t  2conci ,t 3 cos ti ,t 4credi ,t 
5deposit i ,t 6in _ mari ,t 7non int_ inci ,t 8np _ loansi ,t  9overheadi ,t 
10reg _ capi ,t 11ROAi ,t, 12ROEi ,t i ,t , 
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The dynamic specification (2) allows accounting for the fact that the stability of 
the financial sector (our dependent variable) might be characterized by high inertia and 
can be viewed as a time-persistent phenomenon. However, the presence among the 
right-hand side variables of Z-scoret−1, which is correlated with the composite error (αi  
+ εi,t), leads to inconsistent parameter estimates when country heterogeneity is ac-
counted for by means of conventional fixed- or random-effects estimators (Badi H. 
Baltagi 2001). Moreover, specification (2) can be characterized by the presence of 
other endogenous regressors and reverse causality issues. In particular, the solidity of 
the financial sector might have a positive or negative effect on profitability of financial 
institutions (as measured by ROA and ROE).  
To deal with all these issues simultaneously, Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation techniques can be employed. First, the first difference GMM esti-
mator proposed by Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond (1991), which is based on first-
differencing the regression equation to eliminate the country-specific effect and uses 
lagged dependent variables as instruments, can be considered. For the aims of the pre-
sent analysis, the main issue of using this estimator is related to the specific nature of 
Z-score persistency: the cross-sectional variation embodies a large part of the infor-
mation since within-country Z-score level is quite persistent. 
In this respect, although the first-difference GMM estimator allows controlling 
for possible measurement errors, country-specific heterogeneity, and endogeneity bias, 
it does not exploit the variation in levels, which is predominant. Ignoring cross-sec-
tional variation may affect the precision of the estimates and give rise to estimation 
biases. Moreover, as pointed out by Richard Blundell and Bond (1998), the lagged 
levels of the explanatory variables are weak instruments for the variables in differences 
when explanatory variables are persistent.  
The system GMM estimator (Arellano and Olympia Bover 1995; Blundell and 
Bond 1998; Arellano 2014) allows addressing these shortcomings, by fully exploiting 
the cross-country variation in the data. In the system GMM approach, specifications 
in first-differences and in levels are combined. Based on mild stationarity restrictions 
on the initial condition processes, the system estimator augments the difference GMM 
by including an equation in levels and by estimating simultaneously in differences and 
levels, with the two equations distinctly instrumented. Adding the original equation in 
levels preserves the cross-country dimension and allows exploiting additional moment 
conditions that may improve both consistency and efficiency of the estimates. 
The system GMM estimator uses internal instruments (i.e., lagged values of the 
endogenous explanatory variables) and thus requires a more stringent set of restrictions 
than the difference GMM. Variables in levels are instrumented with lagged first dif-
ferences and, in order to consider these additional moments as valid instruments for 
levels, the identifying assumption that past changes of the explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with current errors in levels, which include fixed effects, is required (Da-
vid Roodman 2009). If the moment conditions are valid, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
show that the system GMM estimator performs significantly better than the first-dif-
ference GMM estimator. The validity of the moment conditions can be tested by means 
of the test of over identifying restrictions proposed by John D. Sargan (1958) and Lars 
Peter Hansen (1982) and by testing the null hypothesis of no second order serial 
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correlation in the error term. Furthermore, the validity of the additional moment con-
ditions associated with the level equation can be tested with the difference Sargan/Han-
sen test. 
 
3. Preliminary and Descriptive Evidence  
 
We provide here some descriptive statistics, preliminary to the presentation of the out-
comes of the estimated model. Table 1 presents some summary statistics of our de-
pendent variable. The EU-15 member states exhibited the following: 5 “high” Z-scores 
(Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain), 8 “average” (Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom), and 2 “low” 
Z-scores (Greece, Ireland). Only one country among the EU-13 member states, namely 
Malta, had a Z-score factor at the “high” level. The Z-scores for countries such as 
Estonia and Poland was measured at 12, or the “average” level. It is important to note 
that the EU-associated states, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, had similar Z-score lev-
els. In general, it can therefore be stated that “new” EU member states (EU-13) exhibit 
banking-system stability levels that are obviously lower than the levels featured by 
“old” member states (EU-15).  
 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics Regarding Z-scores for EU-28, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia  
 
Country Min Max Average* Level of Z-score 
Austria 17,88 40,75 26,50 high 
Belgium 3,52 13,00 8,52 average 
Bulgaria -12,61 4,87 3,11 low 
Croatia 3,57 5,67 4,95 low 
Cyprus 1,00 6,75 4,43 low 
Czech Republic 3,29 6,01 4,23 low 
Denmark 6,41 10,76 9,18 average 
Estonia 3,89 11,30 7,48 average 
Finland 7,07 20,80 12,48 average 
France 6,6 13,48 10,82 average 
Germany 8,32 20,18 14,12 high 
Greece -4,11 4,13 1,94 low 
Hungary 4,42 6,04 5,13 average 
Ireland 0,02 8,43 4,45 low 
Italy 6,38 31,40 14,21 high 
Latvia 1,40 2,78 2,44 low 
Lithuania 0,80 4,53 3,22 low 
Luxembourg 21,68 32,70 25,91 high 
Malta 9,73 24,53 17,17 high 
Netherlands 3,24 11,05 7,84 average 
Poland 6,63 8,71 7,89 average 
Portugal 7,67 15,54 11,08 average 
Romania 3,21 4,93 3,82 low 
Slovak Republic 7,05 16,15 12,39 average 
Slovenia -0,34 5,85 3,30 low 
Spain 7,30 15,52 13,73 high 
Sweden 5,34 8,73 6,98 average 
United Kingdom 4,35 13,34 7,86 average 
Ukraine 2,94 8,42 5,40 average 
Moldova 7,39 10,08 8,65 average 
Georgia 4,13 7,65 6,24 average 
 
Notes: * average from 2004 to 2014.  
Source: International Monetary Fund (2013), author’s calculation.  
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The crisis processes in the financial markets since 2007 displayed the capability 
of influencing the market economy to a greater extent than had been expected. In this 
way, the interdependence of the financial and real sectors of the economy increased 
significantly, because the transmission of destructive processes between these seg-
ments was observed to have occurred quite rapidly. The plummeting of macro indica-
tors data for the EU as a whole and for many “new” EU member states fell together 
with the financial crisis and the Lehman shock. 
 
Table 2  Change over Time of the Z-score for EU-28, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia (2004, 2008 and 
2014) 
 
Country 2004 2008 2014 
Austria 21,62 25,02 17,88 
Belgium 7,61 3,52 13,00 
Bulgaria 4,57 4,74 -12,61 
Croatia 3,57 5,48 5,67 
Cyprus 4,42 3,74 4,10 
Czech Republic 4,29 3,98 4,63 
Denmark 10,76 6,41 10,70 
Estonia 6,51 6,20 9,15 
Finland 20,80 10,96 7,09 
France 13,48 6,96 7,78 
Germany 11,33 8,32 20,18 
Greece 3,05 2,13 3,66 
Hungary 6,04 4,42 5,29 
Ireland 8,30 2,65 8,43 
Italy 31,40 13,47 6,38 
Latvia 2,62 2,20 2,78 
Lithuania 3,61 3,21 3,42 
Luxembourg 22,26 21,68 27,20 
Malta 20,90 11,31 9,73 
Netherlands 8,14 3,24 9,63 
Poland 8,66 6,82 8,39 
Portugal 10,26 8,58 15,54 
Romania 4,93 3,65 3,86 
Slovak Republic 10,45 14,26 14,84 
Slovenia 4,22 3,62 5,85 
Spain 15,52 14,17 15,68 
Sweden 7,38 5,34 7,73 
United Kingdom 13,34 4,35 10,19 
Ukraine 8,42 5,14 4,84 
Moldova 10,08 9,68 7,60 
Georgia 6,88 4,13 6,25 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2013), author’s calculation.  
 
Table 2 shows that states in EU-15 in the period prior to the crisis (2004-2008) 
had a high level of financial stability in the banking sector. However, the world finan-
cial crisis significantly reduced the level of financial stability in the European banking 
sector, as reflected in the reduction of the Z-score indicator.  
Only the banking sector in Austria has demonstrated an improved Z-score indi-
cator. Austria already implemented macroprudential measures by 2008 because mini-
mum standards for granting foreign currency loans and loans with repayment vehicles 
were introduced there as early as 2003. These minimum standards were tightened sub-
stantially in October 2008 when the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) is-
sued a new recommendation, and when, in 2010, the FMA and the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank (2016) jointly issued guiding principles for doing business.  
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In the period with the crisis (2008-2014) in most EU-15 countries, namely in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the banking sector shows a gradual restoring to 
their level of financial stability. In particular, this table shows a drastic decline in fi-
nancial stability for Italy’s banking sector during the 2004-2014 period, which is 
shown by the decline in its Z-score level from 31.40 (2004) to 6.38 (2008). This can 
be explained by the strong increase in nonperforming loans (NPL) to about 14 from 
2007 until the end of 2012.  
Table 2 contains significant Z-score fluctuations in the “new” EU member states 
in the period of the crisis.  Between 2008 and 2014, the Z-score level further declined 
for 2 “new” countries – Bulgaria and Malta – and with no significant changes taking 
place in Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and an increase in Z-score level in the Slovak 
Republic. In general, in the period with the crisis it can therefore be stated that “new” 
EU member states exhibit banking-system stability levels that are obviously lower than 
the levels featured by “old” member states.  
Table 3 provides a preliminary correlation analysis aimed at identifying factors  
affecting the EU banking sector’s financial stability that highlight a co-movement with 
the Z-score and with other explanatory variables. The analysis proved that the indica-
tors “bank return on equity” and “bank return on assets” were closely associated with 
each other, so that only one indicator was left for further analysis. The indicators “bank 
cost to income ratio”, “bank credit to bank deposits”, “bank noninterest income to total 
income”, “bank overhead costs to total assets”, “bank regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets” had very little impact on the Z-score.  
Additionally we used to the variance inflation factor (VIF) (see John Neter, 
William Wasserman, and Michael H. Kutner (1985)) to calculate a measure of the 
amount of multicollinearity in a set of multiple regression variables (Table 4).  
 
Table 3  Correlations between the Variables Used in the Model  
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. branch 1   
2. conc -0,370 1   
3. cost -0,185 0,017 1   
4. cred -0,108 0,323 0,114 1   
5. deposit 0,508 -0,261 -0,251 -0,397 1   
6. int_marg -0,036 -0,239 -0,178 -0,200 -0,298 1   
7. nonint_inc  -0,089 -0,049 -0,054 0,044 0,106 -0,302 1   
8. np_loans 0,010 -0,032 0,007 -0,060 -0,070 0,189 -0,042 1   
9. overhead -0,169 -0,213 0,115 -0,136 -0,324 0,814 -0,065 0,136 1   
10. reg_cap -0,152 0,040 -0,072 -0,132 0,093 -0,017 0,115 0,143 -0,085 1   
11. ROA -0,086 -0,098 -0,094 -0,065 -0,107 0,372 0,014 -0,362 0,318 -0,015 1   
12. ROE -0,049 -0,027 -0,319 -0,077 -0,025 0,312 0,047 -0,428 0,239 -0,093 0,718 1  
13. Z-score 0,123 -0,175 0,038 -0,201 0,455 -0,301 0,075 -0,330 -0,248 0,115 0,173 0,064 1
 p-value 0.10 0.03 0.45 0.37 2.6Е-6 0.03 0.19 0.001 0.80 0.11 1.3Е-6 0.098 х
 Significancy * ** n/s n/s *** ** n/s *** n/s n/s *** *
 
Notes: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level, n/s - non significant. 
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Table 4  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for Correlation Analysis Results 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. branch х    
2. conc 1.159 х    
3. cost 1.035 1.000 х    
4. cred 1.012 1.116 1.013 х    
5. deposit 1.348 1.073 1.067 1.187 х    
6. int_marg 1.001 1.061 1.033 1.042 1.098 х   
7. nonint_inc 1.008 1.002 1.003 1.002 1.011 1.101 х   
8. np_loans 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.004 1.005 1.037 1.002 х   
9. overhead 1.029 1.048 1.013 1.019 1.117 2.960 1.004 1.019 х   
10. reg_cap 1.024 1.002 1.005 1.018 1.009 1.000 1.013 1.021 1.007 х   
11. ROA 1.007 1.010 1.009 1.004 1.012 1.161 1.000 1.151 1.112 1.000 х   
12. ROE 1.002 1.001 1.114 1.006 1.001 1.108 1.002 1.225 1.060 1.009 2.064 х  
13. Z-score 1.015 1.031 1.001 1.042 1.261 1.100 1.006 1.122 1.065 1.013 1.031 1.004 х
 




Table 5 presents the results of the baseline model, estimated on the unbalanced panel 
we were able to collect. Due to high correlation and the consequent multicollinearity 
in the econometric model, we excluded the following variables from the baseline esti-
mation: Bank noninterest income to total income (nonint_inc) and bank overhead costs 
to total assets (overhead), both, higly correlated to int_marg; and returns on assets 
(ROA), hihgly correlated to ROE. As indicated in the bottom part of Table 5 (and the 
same holds for Tables 6 and 7), all specifications pass the test for the overall signifi-
cance of the regression, the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation, and the Sargan 
test for overidentifying restrictions. 
Results of the estimation of the baseline model first of all clearly indicate a 
strong pattern of persistence of the dependent variable, as measured by the positive, 
strong and statistically significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The 
stability of the financial system in the previous year is an important and significant 
predictor of the current level of financial stability. A higher Z-score is associated with 
a higher share of deposits to GDP and higher profitability. Bank concentration, the 
number of branches and the occurrence of non-performing loans result in a lower Z-
score.  
 
Table 5  The Drivers of Z-score in EU Countries and EU Associated Members (2007-2014), Baseline 
Model 
 
Explanatory variables Acronym Coeff. sig. 
Lagged dependent variable (Z-score L1) L1 Z_score 0.5968*** 
 (0.0439) 
Bank branches per 100,000 adults Branch -0.0219* 
 (0.0120) 
Bank concentration, % Conc -0.0457*** 
 (0.0144) 
Bank cost to income ratio, % Cost 0.0427* 
 (0.0253) 
Bank credit to bank deposits, % Cred 0.0055 
 (0.0042) 
Bank deposits to GDP, % Deposit 0.0221*** 
 (0.0047) 
Bank net interest margin, % int_marg -0.1520 
 (0.1395) 
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans, % np_loan -0.0932* 
 (0.0525) 
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Bank regulatory cap. to risk-weighted assets, % reg_cap 0.0151 
 (0.0695) 
Bank returns on equity ROE 0.1383*** 
 (0.0376) 
Observations 205 
Time dummies Yes 
Joint significance of time dummies [0.000] 
Wald test 2671.14 (18)*** 
A-B AR(1) test -6.07*** 
A-B AR(2) test 1.40 
Sargan overid.test 1.26 
 
Notes: T statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets; A-B AR(1) and A-B AR(2) are tests for first- 
and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond 1991); * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.5,  
*** p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 describe the heterogeneity of the effects of the various drivers of 
financial stability across the three groups of countries of our interest here. To this aim, 
the baseline empirical model is estimated in a parsimonious version (i.e., keeping only 
the statistically significant variables) (column 1 of Table 6), and then but adding for 
each variable separately its interactions with the country groups dummies (EU-13 and 
EU-ASS). By so doing, the benchmark group is EU-15 countries (main coefficient of 
the variable and the coefficients of the two interaction variables describe the difference 
in the effects of the variable for the remaining two groups. So, for example column 2 
of Table 6 reports the estimates aimed at investigating if the lagged dependent variable 
has a different effect in the three groups of countries. The coefficient of the variable 
L.z_score is 0.6048; this is the effect for EU-15 (the benchmark group) of the lagged 
level of stability (i.e., stability in the previous year) on the current level of stability. 
The coefficient of the first interaction variable (L.z_score *EU-13) is -0.1757; this 
means that the effect of the variable, for the group of new EU member countries (EU-
13) is weaker than for the EU-15, and equals 0.4291 (0.6048 – 0.1757). So, the effect 
for EU-13 is still positive, but weaker compared to EU-15. For the associate countries 
the effect of the variable is even weaker. The coefficient of the second interaction var-
iable (l_z_score*EU-ASS ) is indeed -0.2079, so the effect of the past level of stability 
of the financial sector is, for this group of countries 0.3969, again obtained by summing 
up the coefficient for the reference group (0.6048) and the coefficient for the relevant 
interaction variable (-0.2079). The fact that the coefficients of the interaction variables 
are statistically significant means that their differences compared to the reference 
group are also statistically significant. This evidence suggests that the past level of 
stability of the financial system is a more powerful predictor of current financial sta-
bility in EU-15 economies; in EU-13 and even more in EU-ASS the effect is still pos-
itive but significantly weaker, signalling that here stability in the past is a much weaker 
guarantee of stability in the present. 
Column 3 of Table 6 shows that also the number of branches has a heterogene-
ous effect over the group of countries considered. More precisely, the overall negative 
effect emerged in the baseline model (Table 5) is in fact entirely driven by what hap-
pens in the EU-13 group (variable branch*EU-13). The effect for the benchmark group 
(variable branch) is indeed not significantly different from zero; the effect for the EU-
ASS countries is not significantly different from the benchmark, and is therefore also 
to be considered equal to zero.  
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The last column of Table 6 reports the outcomes of the model augmented with 
the group dummies interacted with the variable conc. Results show that bank sector 
concentration is detrimental to financial stability in all three groups; however, the size 
of this effect is stronger in the EU-13 (-0.0861) and EU-ASS (-0.0648) countries com-
pared to the benchmark group of EU-15 (-0.0487).  
 
Table 6  The Drivers of Z-score in Europe (2007-2014), Parsimonious Model (Country Group Specific 
Effects on Lagged Z-score, Branch, conc) 
 
Acronym Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.z_score 0.5983*** 0.6048*** 0.5619*** 0.5590*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0427) (0.0436) (0.0437) 
L.z_score *EU-13 -0.1757**  
 (0.0754)  
l_z_score*EU-ASS -0.2079*  
 (0.1183)  
Branch -0.0177 -0.0239** -0.0006 -0.0247** 
 (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0112) 
branch*EU-13 -0.0713***  
 (0.0158)  
branch_EU-ASS -0.0836  
 (0.0518)  
Conc -0.0379*** -0.0492*** -0.0631*** -0.0487*** 





Cost 0.0437* 0.0317 0.0232 0.0200 
 (0.0250) (0.0254) (0.0249) (0.0250) 
deposit 0.0213*** 0.0174*** 0.0116** 0.0160*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0043) 
Nploan -0.1225** -0.1121** -0.1066** -0.1163** 
 (0.0495) (0.0497) (0.0486) (0.0480) 
ROE 0.1200*** 0.1290*** 0.1349*** 0.1290*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0361) (0.0357) (0.0349) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint sig. of time d. [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Wald test 2685.9 (15)*** 2734.5 (17)*** 2845.51 (17)*** 2874.47 (17)*** 
A-B AR(1) test -6.15*** -6.11*** -5.39*** -5.99*** 
A-B AR(2) test 1.42 1.38 1.54 1.53 
Sargan overid. test 4.53 2.19 1.91 2.03 
 
Notes: T statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets; A-B AR(1) and A-B AR(2) are tests for first- 
and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond 1991); p < 0.10, ** p < 0.5,  
*** p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 7  The Drivers of Z-score in Europe (2007-2014), Parsimonious Model (Country Group Specific 
Effects on Cost, Deposit, nploan, ROE) 
 
Acronym Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig. Coeff. sig. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.z_score 0.5523*** 0.5661*** 0.5773*** 0.5841*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0496) (0.0432) (0.0461) 
Branch -0.0294** -0.0259** -0.0244** -0.0190* 
 (0.0116) (0.0130) (0.0117) (0.0110) 
Conc -0.0658*** -0.0614*** -0.0624*** -0.0460*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0210) (0.0153) (0.0150) 
Cost 0.0388 0.0250 0.0297 0.0337 
 (0.0244) (0.0283) (0.0249) (0.0263) 
cost*EU-13 -0.0506***  
 (0.0119)  
cost*EU-ASS -0.0435***  
 (0.0148)  
Deposit 0.0153*** 0.0166*** 0.0167*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0047) 
deposit*EU-13 -0.0391  
 (0.0327)  
deposit*EU-ASS -0.0547  
 (0.0442)  
Nploan -0.0973** -0.1042** -0.0547 -0.1295*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0503) (0.0511) (0.0496) 
nploan*EU-13 -0.2314***  
 (0.0594)  
nploan*EU-ASS -0.1863**  
 (0.0836)  
ROE 0.1332*** 0.1297*** 0.1200*** 0.1534*** 





Observations 205 205 205 205 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint sig. of time d. [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Wald test 2869.15 (17)*** 2823.73 (17)*** 2810.56 (17)*** 2706.95 (17)*** 
A-B AR(1) test -5.90*** -5.78*** -5.93*** -5.98*** 
A-B AR(2) test 1.60 1.59 1.48 1.46 
Sargan overid. test 3.11 2.43 2.78 6.86 
 
Notes: T statistics are based on robust standard errors and reported in brackets; A-B AR(1) and A-B AR(2) are tests for first- 
and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond 1991); p < 0.10, ** p < 0.5,  
*** p < 0.01. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Results in the first column of Table 7 show that positive and not very significant 
effect of cost (bank cost to income ratio) emerged in the baseline model (Table 5) in 
fact hides remarkable hereogeniety across groups of countries; when the interaction 
variables are included in the model, the effect for EU-15 countries is not significant, 
wherease higher cost to income ratios are associeted to lower financial stability (as 
expected) in EU-13 and EU-ASS. 
The inclusion of interactions for the variables deposit and ROE (columns 2 and 
4 of Table 7, respectively), reveal that no statistically significant differences in the 
effects of these variables emerge for the three groups of countries; this is, however, 
not the case for the impact of the share of non perfoming loans (to gross loans). Their 
negative impact on the stability of the banking sector is indeed limited to the case of 
EU-13 and EU-ASS countries, while no statistically significant effect emerges for EU-
15.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Ensuring sustainable and steady development of the banking sector depends on its sta-
bility, i.e. ability to perform its functions under the influence of internal and external 
destructive factors. This paper investigated the drivers of financial stability in the bank-
ing sector in EU countries and EU associated members. In general, the solidity of the 
banking sector in EU associated members are obviously lower than levels featured by 
EU-13, and much lower than in the EU-15. This first piece of evidence calls for urgent 
and appropriate regulatory activities, in EU associated members, primarily from the 
central bank, able to pose the conditions for a reinforcment of the financial sector. 
Econometric results of the present paper suggest on which fronts these initiatives could 
be implemented. Our empirical model employs the Z-score indicator to measure the 
stability of the banking sector in the short-term period (annual, quarterly): an increase 
of the value of this indicator shows an improvement of financial stability of the bank-
ing sector and vice versa – the decline of this indicator signals less resistance and more 
vulnerability. Z-scores are used as the dependent variable of dynamic panel economet-
ric model of the drivers of financial instability, estimated by GMM-Sys in order to 
address various issues simultaneously (namely, the persistence of the dependent vari-
able over time and endogeneity issues). Our analysis covers EU member countries and 
the three associated countries (Ukraine, Georgia and Modavia) for the period 2007-
2014. Results indicatate that for the EU associated countries and post-communist 
countries the potential sources of voulnerability of the banking sector are more numer-
ous and more powerful. The detrimental effect of banking sector concentration is in-
deed stronger in the new EU-member states and in the associated countries compared 
to EU-15; in addition, the negative impact of higher costs and non-performing loans is 
only statistically significant in these two groups, but not for EU-15. On the contrary, 
the stability of the banking sector in previous years is more powerful in predicting 
stability than in the current year in EU-15. In the two remaining groups (and particu-
larly for the associated countries), the fact that the sector was solid in the previous year 
provides a significantly decreased less guarantee that it will be solid in the future. In 
other words, the banking sector still remains in EU eastern countries and in EU asso-
ciated countries, relatively more vulnerable and fragile. 
In general, integration into the world economy helps countries improve the ef-
ficiency of their banking sectors. As Jens Hölscher, Nicole Nulsch, and Johannes 
Stephan (2017) recognize, EU membership encouraged early – transition countries to 
improve the efficiency of their banking sectors. The implementation of the approach 
in EU countries has been  reflected in the banking union formation, the introduction of 
more stringent regulatory requirements for certain banks, bank merger and acquisition 
procedures, in accordance with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recom-
mendations. As Andreas Horsch, Sysoyeva, and Sergii Bogma (2018) argues, coun-
tries which are striving for EU membership should be aware of the institutional change 
that still leads to additional regulation of European financial markets. Although our 
empirical analysis only covers a limited set of aspects, based on the experience of the 
EU-15, other measures should be considered equally urgent in order to assure the pre-
conditions for the effectiveness of the initiative now listed. Based on our results, the 
priority measures to be implemented in order to improve financial stability in EU 
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associated countries should include the following measures: (i) reduction of banking 
sector concentration and a further purification of the banking system from financial 
institutions which are insolvent or do not comply with the law; (ii) tightening of the 
sheet balance requirements of banks related to costs and non-performing loans and 
tightening of banks’ lending policies that took place (more thorough credit risk analy-
sis of potential loan applicants and more rigorous qualifications for lending criteria); 
(iii) encouraging a larger size of deposits in the economy; (iv) limiting the concentra-
tion of long-term risks (short-term funding of banks, a significant level of dollarization 
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